par Milgrom, Paul
Columbia University Press
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Disponible - 330.4 MIL
Niveau 3 - Economie
Discovering prices : auction design in markets with complex constraints
| Auteur(s) : |
Milgrom, Paul
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Résumé
Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith’s famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What’s needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied.
- Éditeur(s)
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Date
- 2021
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Langues
- Anglais
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Description matérielle
- 1 vol. (XII-232 p.) : ill., couv ill. en coul. ; 23 cm
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- Sujet(s)
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ISBN
- 978-0-231-17599-9
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Indice
- 330.4 Microéconomie
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Origine de la notice:
- BPI
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Disponible - 330.4 MIL
Niveau 3 - Economie
